
Let me rephrase my views like this.
“The bureaucracy is expanding, to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy”. This quote by Oscar Wilde remains a truism amongst many opponents of increased integration in the European Union. Certainly, with the batch of new Eastern member states that statement rings true all the more. Twenty seven states are now seeking to maximize their self-interest. From a less pessimistic point of view these states could be seen to join forces in order to assert a competitive position in a global environment at a time when European influence is often dubbed as ‘a waning economic giant’ or ‘a soft power’ at best. An important question is whether or not the increasing bureaucracy and malfunctioning of the EU is caused exactly by those anti-integrationist forces. After the UK failed to establish the industrial policy domain in which the nation would gain significantly by entering the EU, a powerful critique of further EU integration was born. Hence the famously quoted Margaret ‘I want my money back’ Thatcher during the debate on budget rebate and the genuine enmity towards the union of many UK citizens. A few decades later the EU is still struggling with integrationists willing to take the initiative towards a unified union, and opponents with an opposite agenda. However, recent events have proved that a new orientation for the EU is essential if a relapse towards traditional power politics and unilateral policy is to be avoided.
Scrutinizing the efficiency of the EU presents us with a paradox. Advocates of the intergovernmental cooperation model often reject an integrationist approach because the EU is becoming too large, or that it has too little decisiveness. They claim it’s not able to speak out with a strong voice, thus weakening the position of the EU and their respective countries. Therefore it needs to be reduced to a mainly economic partnership that is preferably based on intergovernmental decision making. The first difficulty with this stance is the problem of two-level games whereby country representatives sitting around the international table can’t agree with a rational proposal from an international point of view because it would be impolitic on the domestic level, or vice versa. Secondly, because a large and cultural differing union always has divergent interests the preference for intergovernmental decision-making is evidently a serious drawback in negotiations that require swift and resolute action. It seems that the failings attributed to the EU are precisely caused by the lack of change in the EU.
Let us take a look at why France and The Netherlands voted against the so called EU constitution in 2005. It was partly rejected because of domestic dislike towards the parties supporting the constitution. More importantly however, the EU was widely portrayed as undemocratic, and sovereignty would be lost to a nondescript European Union. The truth is that same constitution would increase the democratic character of the EU, and the decrease of sovereignty was nothing near incorporation into a new state despite the many claims by anti-constitution advocates that their country would become irrelevant.
Meanwhile in the financial crisis the Commission and Barroso have appeared weak and feeble-minded. The President neglected to launch a ‘European initiative’ to revive the collapsing financial system. Nonetheless it is Barroso’s job to act in the Union’s interest and to promote European ‘significance’. In short: the Commission needs to formulate new ideas. Closer examination reveals that Barroso didn’t propose the foundation of a European financial supervisor because the larger European member states disapproved. These countries aren’t too keen on losing tight control over their financial institutions. We now get down to the very root of the issue. The President of the Commission is appointed by the Council composed of state leaders so Barroso is directly dependent on the Council for his reappointment. To what extent can he operate independently? Recent events point out that when it boils down to core issues, it’s still the member state governments who call the shots. Despite the changes implemented since the Maastricht Treaty governments still carry much of the weight as has been demonstrated clearly during the current crisis.
In turn, this process fuels the people who fail to see the value of a more politically unified Europe: as the EU doesn’t take action to solve the crisis, it’s the member states who are required to act on their own. Again this is simply due to the fact that the EU doesn’t get the necessary tools to deal with the problem. The European Central Bank’s most important role is the containment of inflation. It was not conceived to possess jurisdiction over the banking system. It cannot prevent any abuse or disaster from happening whatsoever. This reduces the ECB to an institution that merely patches up imbalances regarding monetary issues. Thus the EU lacks an authoritative voice in financial and monetary matters as much as in the more commonly known 2nd and 3rd pillar judicial and foreign policy domains. Granted, a country like Germany supported an ECB with inflation regulatory powers only because Germany as the largest net contributor by far would bear most of the costs without having much control over her money. Still, the current financial crisis bitterly illustrates the weakness of a union of which the member states refuse to hand over their sovereignty.
The Irish refusal of the Lisbon Treaty in June now gets a whole new dimension. The patchwork that the Lisbon Treaty provides would not solve the problems mentioned above. It would only prepare the EU to remain viable with the introduction of the new eastern member states. Some people voice the opinion that it’s best not to ratify the Treaty since a successor to it will not be compiled for a very long time. Work on a treaty with better provisions should be started instead. One problem there is that the apparent problems have been latently present for a long time. The more they rise to the surface, the more disapproval will be created towards the EU. Ratification of a more ‘integrationist’ treaty would then become even harder than it already was.
This brings us to an essential point. Sovereignty needs to be redefined. The twentieth century has time and time again proven the failure of traditional power politics. Richard Perle, an influential political advisor in the US points out the following: “I do not believe that the United States should be bound by the same rules as the smallest African nation. Life isn't like that”. For years the United States have indeed denounced the same rules that bind the international world. As long as this fundamentally unjust basic assumption defines international policy worldwide, more integration will be impossible. America’s reputation is tarnished, and its influence around the world is slowly waning. Clinging onto power and pursuing self-interest at the expense of others as the essential criterion is counterproductive in the long run. Europeans would do well to bear in mind this conclusion when they belittle the importance of the EU.
A tentative alternative could be that a common ground for a Europe at divergent speeds could be established, in which the Eurogroup takes the initiative towards the European future. These countries would constitute the avant-garde, as opposed to countries like the UK who have been sceptical throughout the years of her membership. Efforts in this direction have been made previously, notably by former Belgian prime minister Guy Verhofstadt. However, in general there had formerly been little enthusiasm for this divergent but unified Europe. Chairman Jean-Claude Juncker of the Eurogroup admitted earlier this year that several of his Eurogroup members didn’t desire any more political unification. In the current situation then, when leaders surely contemplate the lack of decisiveness, this concept might very well find broad support after all. Bernard Bulcke of De Standaard nailed it perfectly when he said that “not so much the inspired thinkers, but crises have always been the engine of European integration”. With the right mindset employed by political leaders in Europe, the crisis could be pivotal for a new direction of the EU after all.